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Summary Findings 
 
 Overall, the evidence that has emerged since 2010 continues to support the 
key aspects of the model. 
 The direct effects on peace and stability of “core state functions” and “political 
settlements” are arguably more important than their indirect impact on better 
state-society relations and legitimacy. 
 Evidence for the potential tensions between different parts of the model is 
not reflected in the PBSB policy. 
 The evidence raises the question whether objective 1 (addressing causes 
and consequences of conflict) should remain an overall lens on statebuilding 
activities, or be elevated to its own distinct set of activities. The current role in 
the model underplays the contribution of dedicated conflict resolution 
activities, and risks underplaying the potential tensions between state- and 
peacebuilding. 
 There is little attention to the sub-state level, and to informal actors, the 
importance of which is increasingly highlighted in the evidence. 
 There is little attention to the role of the international and regional 
environment, including factors such as illicit financial flows, migration, or other 
transnational dynamics. 
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Purpose 
This Evidence Review focuses on the broad causal claims about the sources of and 
pathways to stability that underpin the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS), 
and the DFID Building Peaceful States and Societies Practice Paper (BPSS). It 
systematically examines the evidence landscape underpinning the Peace- and 
Statebuilding framework outlined in both papers, evaluates how it changed over the 
last 5 years, and identifies some of the implications of this. 
The paper proceeds in three steps. First, drawing on BSOS and BPSS, it 
briefly outlines the peace- and statebuilding model, and critically examines some of 
the key assumptions underpinning the model in light of the current evidence 
landscape. Second, it identifies and evaluates research evidence published since 
2010, which pertains to the four guiding objectives of the BPSS framework: 
addressing causes and consequences of conflict; inclusive political settlements; 
development of core state functions; and responsiveness to public expectations. The 
final section outlines the changes in the evidence landscape for peace- and 
statebuilding, and their implications for PBSB policy. 
 
The Model: Building Peaceful and Stable States and Societies 
BSOS and BPSS rely on a common understanding of stability and the conditions that 
make for an effective state (that is a state which is capable, accountable, and 
responsive), and have a similar understanding of how such conditions can be 
fostered by external actors. In BSOS, this is framed in terms of upstream prevention: 
“work[ing] to address the causes of conflict and fragility; support an inclusive political 
system which builds a closer society; and strengthen the state’s own ability to deliver 
security, justice and economic opportunity.” (DfID 2011, p. 24).  
In BPSS, it is framed in terms of state- and peacebuilding - building the 
capacity, institutions, and legitimacy of the state, addressing the grievances 
underlying conflict, and building institutions that can manage social conflicts in a non-
violent manner (DfID 2010, pp-13-14). BPSS breaks down the model into four 
objectives, all of which are also reflected in the BSOS notion of upstream prevention: 
addressing causes and consequences of conflict; promoting inclusive political 
settlements; developing core state functions; and responding to public expectations. 
While BPSS treats the first objective as an overarching (peacebuilding) lens through 
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which statebuilding activities under the other three should be evaluated, the 
remaining three all have different theories of change that underpin them (Box 1).
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Box 1: PBSB Objectives and their Theories of Change: 
Promoting Inclusive Political Settlements: the inclusion of competing elites into a 
political settlement can reduce the risk of violent challenges to the existing political 
order, as they give them voice and a role in shaping the rules governing economic 
relations and resource allocation. Rival elites abstain from challenges either because 
they perceive the new order to be legitimate, or because they now have a material 
interest in its continuity. 
Developing core state functions: increasing the capacity of the state to provide core 
functions such as security, the rule of law, and sound macro-economic policies 
increases popular trust, facilitates the provision of public services, and strengthens 
state legitimacy. This reduces the risk of violent challenges to the state, and 
strengthens the capacity of state institutions to manage such challenges. 
Strengthened core functions can also have a direct effect on stability, e.g. through 
stronger security forces. 
Responding to Public Expectations: The provision of public goods and services 
expected by the population from the state strengthens state legitimacy, and reduces 
the risk of violent opposition to the state. 
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There are two other aspects of BPSS that are worth highlighting before reviewing the 
development of the evidence underpinning the model. The first is the central (if 
largely implicit) assumption that these different objectives all reinforce each other – 
that “all good things go together” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). While this 
assumption is prominently reflected in Acemoglu and Robinson’s Why Nations Fail 
(2012), recent evidence largely challenges this assumption. Instead, it points to the 
way in which inclusive elite settlements, for example, can prevent the development of 
core state functions as powerful parts of the elite maintain an interest in a weak rule 
of law, or a degree of insecurity, as they facilitate their accumulation of private 
wealth, and sustain their bargaining power (Putzel and Di John 2012, Berdal and 
Zaum 2013, Khan 2010, Keen 2011). This evidence suggests that there are often 
trade-offs between these different objectives. 
Second, while the model brings together both peace- and statebuilding, it remains 
largely silent on the different possible relationships between the two: 
 
 Peacebuilding efforts, for example mediation or the negotiation of a peace 
agreement, can precede statebuilding, opening the opportunity and creating 
the environment within which donors can start to engage in statebuilding 
efforts. 
 State- and peacebuilding can have a causal relationship, but one that runs 
the other direction: statebuilding activities, e.g. through building the capacity 
of institutions to manage conflicts non-violently, and by addressing core 
grievances, contribute to peacebuilding. 
 The relationship between the two can be inherently conflictual: state-building, 
like state formation, which at its heart still has the formalisation and 
centralisation of political authority (and the establishment of the monopoly of 
force) can be violent and undermine peacebuilding efforts (Parks et al. 2013; 
Berdal and Zaum 2013).  
  
BPSS largely focusses on the second (effective statebuilding contributing to 
peacebuilding), and in particular plays down the potentially violent character of 
statebuilding and the consolidation of political authority. 
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State of the Evidence 
 
1 Methods 
Evidence for this paper was identified in several ways: 
 
 Keyword search of key bibliographic databases (Scopus, Web of 
Science, and Google Scholar) for evidence published after 2010 
 Review of citations in relevant research studies published after 2010 
(“snowball search”)
 Review of publications of relevant DFID funded research programmes 
(esp. Crisis States Programme, JSRP, and SLRC)
 Reliance of the research team’s knowledge of the existing literature 
 
Given the limited time and scope of this paper, the quality of individual studies was 
not formally evaluated, instead the team formed a view of the overall strength of the 
evidence on the basis of the whole reviewed corpus, based on the focus of the 
identified studies, the quality of the data they use, and the appropriateness and 
quality of their methods in light of the research questions they pose. Further 
information on search strings and the number of studies identified is provided in the 
different sections.1 
 
2 Support inclusive political settlements 
 
Political settlements are the expression of a common understanding, 
usually forged between elites about how power is organised and 
exercised. They include formal institutions for managing political and 
economic relations, such as electoral processes, peace agreements, 
parliaments, constitutions and market regulations. But they also include 
informal, often unarticulated agreements that underpin a political system, 
                                                          
1 This systematic approach was used with regard to two of the BPSS objectives: strengthening core sate 
functions, and responding to public expectations. The political settlements evidence review draws on a 
parallel paper work commissioned by DFID, which has used a similarly systematic approach. As the 
objective “addressing the causes and consequences of conflict” is treated as a lens on statebuilding 
rather than its discrete set of activities with an underlying theory of change, less systematic search 
methods were used. 
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such as deals between elites on the division of spoils. Political 
settlements establish the basic rules governing economic relations and 
resource allocation (DfID 2010, p. 22). 
 
Political settlements have been identified as central to processes of building stable 
and effective institutions, not only in BPSS but also in the wider donor and academic 
literature, which emphasises their importance for understanding both the factors that 
contribute to the development of effective institutions, and to minimising violence. 
Overall, the political settlements debate has been largely conceptual (e.g. Laws 
2012, Elgin-Cossart et al. 2012, Parks and Cole 2010). Existing case study work 
(e.g. as part of the crisis states programme) has mainly helped to refine the concept, 
rather than examining causal claims about the impact of settlements (there are 
exceptions though, such as Lindeman 2008, 2010). DFID reviewed the evidence 
supporting Objective 2 of BPSS, and found it by and large supported by the evidence 
base as it existed in 2010 (Evans 2012).2 
 
2.1 Inclusive Settlements 
In the context of the peace- and statebuilding model, two theories of change inform 
the emphasis on inclusive political settlements. Inclusive settlements are said, first, to 
reduce grievances by including relevant elites into the settlement, and thereby giving 
them a stake in maintaining the settlement, making the settlement legitimate in their 
eyes, and encouraging participation in the supporting peace- and statebuilding 
processes. Second, settlements that are “vertically inclusive” of non-elites (or “open” 
to non-elites) are said to foster growth and economic development, providing the 
state in the long run with the wherewithal to sustain its core functions and meet pubic 
expectations, thereby legitimating and stabilising the state. 
As has been pointed out Elgin-Cossart and Jones (2012), the typology of 
political settlements used in BPSS is problematic, as the different types of settlement 
outlined are not mutually exclusive but strongly overlap, as they are distinguished 
either by their degree and nature of inclusivity, or their process of genesis: an 
engineered settlement, for example, could at the same time be an informal elite pact, 
while an imposed settlement could be highly inclusive (at least at the formal level). A 
more useful distinction might be a model that distinguishes according to the degree of 
                                                          
2 CHASE has commissioned a separate review of the evidence on Political Settlements, conducted by 
Alina Rocha Menocal in spring 2015. This section draws on the findings of an earlier draft of this paper. 
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inclusion, and the degree of institutionalisation (e.g. Levy 2014). 
The “two-level game” character of political settlements (involving bargains 
between different elites, and between elites and non-elites) raises further questions 
about inclusivity, in particular whether horizontal inclusivity (of different elites) or 
vertical inclusivity (empowering non-elites) is more important for containing violence 
or for making institutions growth-enhancing and developmental? In some of the work, 
there is a hidden assumption that horizontal inclusion of elites also brings their 
followers into the settlement (and makes them indirect beneficiaries of it), but the 
distributive consequences for rents, and the consequences of non-elite access to 
and responsiveness of institutions remains largely unaddressed. The difficult 
relationship between horizontal and vertical inclusion is highlighted by research of 
the Crisis States Programme (CSP). It suggests that that a settlement can be 
resilient, but non-developmental. One reason for its resilience is its horizontal 
inclusivity. However, this also makes it more difficult to change such a settlement, as 
the broad inclusion of elites creates many potential veto players who have a stake in 
the status quo and would risk losing access to rents if the order is opened up 
vertically (Putzel and DiJohn 2012, De Waal 2009). While there is strong theoretical 
support for the importance of vertical inclusion for a more developmental order (e.g. 
North et al. 2009; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012), Khan and CSP’s work also points 
to an important trade-off between horizontal and vertical inclusivity: pushing vertical 
inclusion too far can push a political settlement beyond the minimum level of stability 
required for a settlement, and result in violence and crisis (Khan 2010). The 
recognition that horizontal inclusion is important for stability (Call 2012), but is also 
an obstacle towards a more open and developmental order is also reflected in the 
wider power sharing literature (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Jarstad and Sisk 2008). 
 
2.2 Changing Political Settlements 
While a range of macro-level accounts of political settlements (e.g. Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2012; North et.al. 2009) outline broad processes of their transformation, 
the literature is generally weak on the central question of how countries transition 
from one political settlement to another – both on what generates the incentives for 
ruling elites to “open up” a settlement, and on how such change can be facilitated by 
external actors. 
One key insight from the political settlements literature is that if the distributive 
consequences of formal institutions are at odds with the distribution of power 
underlying a settlement, or if they are insufficient to maintain a settlement, informal 
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institutions will adapt the distribution of rents to reflect the character of the settlement 
and the balance of power (e.g. Khan 2010; Putzel and DiJohn 2012). Change in the 
nature of political settlements is therefore unlikely to come from tinkering with the 
form and function of formal institutions. Khan’s (2010) work further suggests that the 
impact of institutional change on power balances can open the way for further 
changes to the settlement, though the ways in which it changes bargaining 
processes, or empowers particular actors. If institutions – both formal and informal – 
are increasingly recognised as constitutive parts of a settlement, important questions 
arise about how institutions and institutional change affect power balances over time. 
North et. al. (2009) identify two conditions for change: first, elites need to feel 
relatively secure, providing incentives for institutionalisation and the formalisation of 
power relationships (but this does not open up these relationships, and does not 
facilitate access to power for previously marginalised groups). Second, groups 
excluded from access to institutions need to be powerful and vocal enough to 
demand an opening of the system, and pose a credible challenge to ruling elites so 
that it is less costly for elites to surrender some of their power rather than risk conflict 
and being overthrown. The immediately obvious problem this raises is that these two 
conditions do not naturally go together.  
Levy identifies two pathways for different types of settlement. In environments 
with weak institutions where decision-making is centralised under a cohesive elite, 
development towards a more open settlement proceeds from strengthening the 
bureaucracy and state institutions, inducing growth which can lead to the 
strengthening of the private sector and civil society who demand greater openness 
(e.g. South Korea, Indonesia). In countries with weak institutions where cohesion is 
weak and decision-making contested (e.g. Bangladesh), growth (coming from 
“islands of effectiveness”) stimulates a strengthened bureaucracy and a growing 
private sector/civil society, which can then stimulate greater openness and the rule of 
law. What is obvious from this rough sketch of the process is that such a transition is 
highly contingent on contextual factors. 
Finally, both Pritchett and Werker (2012) and William Reno (2011) suggest 
that societies transition from what the former has termed “deals to rules” (Pritchett 
and Werker 2012) Both suggest that political settlements underlie the “deals” 
between elites that provide a degree of stability, and raise questions about the 
processes through which societies transition to “rules”: what are the conditions under 
which such transitions are made within societies or certain sectors, like Angola’s oil 
industry (Soares de Oliveira 2011) or Rwanda’s and Ethiopia’s “developmental neo-
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patrimonialism” (Kelsall and Booth 2010)? These observations and arguments offer 
analytical access points for theorising and theory testing, but on their own not a 
robust evidence base. 
 
2.3 Assessment 
In summary, there is strong empirical support for the claim that elite inclusion is 
important for resilience against violent conflict (but at the risk of entrenching a non-
developmental order), and for the broad claim that open political settlements facilitate 
economic growth and development. However, evidence on the transition processes, 
and on mechanisms through which donors can support such transitions, remains 
weak.3 
 
3 Develop core state functions 
 
“There are some functions that the state must be able to perform to 
govern its territory and operate at the most basic level. Evidence 
suggests that three are indispensable: security; law and justice; and 
finance and macroeconomic management. But without a clear focus on 
improving accountability within each function, there is a risk that the 
state will exert control without responding to the population’s needs, 
creating a strong but potentially repressive state” (DfID 2010, p. 27). 
 
For a state to be considered functional and to have any direct impact on its 
population, it requires the capacity to fulfil some basic functions. BPSS focusses on 
three in particular: 
 
 the capacity to provide a degree of security 
 the provision of the rule of law to resolve inevitable social conflicts
 and a degree of financial and macroeconomic management to provide for 
the financial wherewithal to sustain the state.  
 
It is difficult to par down the list of core functions further than that, and their centrality 
is reflected in the wider literature on the state (World Bank 1997, Weber 1978). 
                                                          
3 The weakness of this evidence was also established in the scoping process for a DFID funded RPC on 
political settlements, which has been commissioned and which aims at strengthening the relevant 
evidence. 
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How does the ability to fulfil these core functions contribute to state- and 
peacebuilding? Several theories of change inform this objective. On the one hand, 
greater capacity of the state (e.g. to coerce challengers or to resolve conflicts and 
local grievances) reduces the risk of violent conflict. On the other, the ability to 
perform these core functions increases the legitimacy of the state, increases 
compliance with its demands, and reduces violent challenges to it.4 
 
3.1 Strengthening Security 
There is robust evidence for a close relationship between improving the coercive 
capacity of the state through strengthening the capacity and presence of police and 
military, and reductions in armed conflict. Lee et al.’s (2014) cross-national study 
shows that the state’s monopoly of force has a positive impact on security (in terms 
of lower levels of violence), a finding that is confirmed by a number of single country 
case studies, e.g. of Nepal (Crozier and Candan 2010), Colombia (Elhawary 2010), 
and Afghanistan (Koehler and Gosztonyi 2014).5 
The BPSS claim that stronger state capacity – especially coercive capacity – 
needs to be accompanied by greater accountability, is similarly supported by the 
research evidence. Strengthening coercive capacity can exacerbate tensions and 
fuel in particular sub-national conflict: by exacerbating perceptions of marginalisation 
and exclusion that fuel grievances (Mehler 2012, Knight 2012, Crozier and Candan 
2010, Gippert 2015); by fuelling elite competition; by forcing rebels to resort to force 
to counter-act the extension of state capacity and legitimacy; or because the 
deliberate strengthening of the coercive capacity of the state is used to change the 
dynamics of a conflict and seek victory rather than a settlement (Parks et al. 2013). 
 
3.2 Law and Justice 
There is robust evidence for a correlation between the strengthening of justice 
systems and reductions in violent conflict. The literature identifies two related 
mechanisms. 
                                                          
4 Evidence was identified through searches in SCOPUS, Web of Science, and Google Scholar. Search 
terms that were used included the terms statebuilding, peacebuilding, security, rule of law, peace, civil 
war, legitimacy, tax, trust, stability, resource curse, resource management, scarcity, governance, 
security dilemma, grievances, greed, opportunity, and feasibility. The terms generated 1354 hits in 
Scopus, 86 hits in WoS, and 17,400 hits in Google Scholar. 220 articles were selected on the basis of 
title and key words, and this was further reduced to 50 following abstract reviews. 30 articles were 
identified through snowball searches and from other review papers. 
 
5 It should be noted that Lee et al. (2014) also find that the relationship does not hold in several Latin 
American countries in particular, where substantial coercive capacity has not reduced high rates of 
homicide. 
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First, the lack of functioning justice institutions, or the lack of access to such 
institutions, means that grievances, especially local level grievances, remain 
unaddressed (e.g. Allen et al. 2013, Desai and Sage 2011, Friedman 2012). This 
raises the risk that these grievances fuel violent conflict – a finding that chimes with 
the growing evidence for the importance of local dynamics and causes of violence 
(e.g. Autessere 2010, Kalyvas 2006). 
Second, poor access to and corruption in justice institutions undermine 
perceptions of state legitimacy, fuel grievances and raise the likelihood of armed 
resistance against the state (Coburn 2011; Desai and Sage 2011).6 The literature 
also highlights the complex relationship between formal and informal justice 
mechanisms, and in particular the use of the latter to bolster the legitimacy of the 
former (Coburn 2011, Bennett et al. 2010, Charley and M’Cormack 2012). This raises 
interesting wider questions about the relationship between formal and informal 
institutions, and the role of informal institutions in the statebuilding policies of donors, 
which are firmly focussed on formalising political authority. 
 
3.3 Financial and Macroeconomic management 
A capacity for fiscal and macroeconomic management is essential if a state wants to 
be able to finance is operations, and participate in the global economic system 
(World Bank 1997). BPSS highlights several aspects of this core function: tax 
collection and revenue management, and policies to ensure macroeconomic stability. 
The framework also mentions natural resource management – an issue that has 
been increasingly highlighted in the literature over the last decade, mainly because of 
growing interest in the governance consequences of the so-called “resource curse”.7 
The evidence review therefore focusses on taxation and natural resource 
management. 
Tax collection is thought to impact on peace- and statebuilding in three ways 
(Rao 2014, Pritchard 2010, Everest-Philips 2010). First, it provides resources to fund 
core state functions and respond to public expectations through the provision of 
public services – thus contributing to state legitimacy. Second, improving tax 
collection has wider benefits for state capacity: tax collection is demanding, requires 
states for example to develop a capacity to register citizens and businesses, to 
monitor them to be able to collect tax – practices that have wider implications for 
other state functions. Finally, taxation increases expectations of those taxed (be they 
                                                          
6 See also the discussion on corruption and state fragility below. 
7 See for example Aslaken 2010; Brollo et al. 2010; Busse and Gröning 2013; Tsui 2011; Vincente 2010.  
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citizens or businesses) towards the state, and pressure to respond to these 
expectations.8 
New evidence with regard to the role of taxation in state building is limited, 
but generally supportive of some of these claims. A range of studies finds evidence 
that more effective tax collection has increased expectations towards the state, 
expectations which are also voiced by citizens and businesses. (Martin 2013, Moore, 
Mascagni and McCluskley 2013, Pritchard 2010). There is some evidence that better 
tax collection correlates to overall improvements in state capacity from a quantitative 
cross-country analysis (Pritchard and Leonard 2010), however, these effects seem to 
have declined over the last decade, and whether there is a causal link or whether 
they are co-determined is not clear, as the authors acknowledge. With regard to 
improving tax collection, research examining the impact of ODA on tax collection 
suggests that it has at best no effect, and at worst a negative effect on local taxation. 
(Benedek et al. 2012, Morrisey et al. 2014). 
Mechanisms to manage access to and use of natural resources can reduce 
violent conflict by reducing grievances of groups excluded from their use, by 
managing conflicts over the use of resources such as land or water, and by limiting 
the opportunities for armed groups to use natural resource income to finance their 
use of force. These theories of change rest on arguments about governance effects 
of the “resource curse”, and the growing “opportunities” literature on civil war 
(Blattman and Miguel 2010). 
While there is robust evidence for a link between natural resource abundance 
and aspects of weak governance, especially corruption (Aslaken 2010; Brollo et al. 
2010; Busse and Gröning 2013; Vincente 2010), there is only limited evidence for a 
causal relationship between resource abundance and armed conflict (Cuvelier et al. 
2013). In their review of the evidence, Cuvelier et al. criticise the literature for its 
focus on macro-level analysis, and too little attention to micro-level factors (a 
criticism also voiced by Autesserre (2010), including local socio-political processes 
and varying geographic implications of natural resources. 
With regard to resource management mechanisms, there is limited but quite 
robust evidence that the impact of mechanisms geared towards the sharing of 
resource wealth have little or no effect on the risk of violent conflict (Maehler et al. 
2011, Binningsbø and Rustad 2012, but see Barrow 2010), Binningsbo and Rustad’s 
limited quantitative analysis of 254 post-conflict periods of peace finds that only land 
                                                          
8 See also Joanna McGowan, Tax and Poverty Reduction, Chief Economist Office Background Paper, 
DFID, April 2015.  
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reform has a statistically significant correlation with peace. 
 
3.4 Assessment 
Overall, recent evidence supports the strengthening core functions objective of 
BPSS, only the growing focus in PBSB discussions on natural resource management 
finds little support. The evidence reviewed here suggests that strengthening core 
state functions mainly contributes to peace- and statebuilding directly (e.g. thorough 
strengthened coercive capacity), and works indirectly through enhancing state 
legitimacy mainly in the longer term. The evidence also supports the emphasis in 
BPSS on enhancing accountability as well as capacity, and confirms the risks to 
peace- and statebuilding of “unrestrained” states. 
 
 
4 Respond to public expectations 
 
Respond to public expectations: States need to meet public 
expectations in order to maintain legitimacy and stability. International 
actors should be careful not to make assumptions about the 
expectations of different groups in society, and must recognise that 
public goods are often delivered in ways that maintain an exclusionary 
political settlement. Public expectations that are a high priority in many 
fragile contexts include jobs and growth, delivery of basic services 
(including security and justice), human rights and democratic 
processes 
(DfID 2010, p. 7). 
 
Assessing the evidence for the importance of a state’s (and donors’) responsiveness 
to public expectations is complicated both by the diversity of public expectations both 
across and within fragile and conflict-affected societies, and over time, and by the 
fact that research in this area is rarely framed in terms of public expectations, but in 
terms of the importance of service delivery, especially for legitimacy. While this 
objective is often reduced to the role of service delivery, it is important to recognise 
that BPSS frames this objective more broadly, focussing on inclusive growth, job 
creation, and basic services such as health, education, social protection, and water 
and sanitation. The paper also notes that alternative service providers (such as non-
governmental organisations) may exist alongside the state (DfID 2010), though it 
does not further outline how various different service providers might interact with 
each other. 
The theory of change underpinning this objective suggests that meeting public 
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expectations strengthens the legitimacy of and trust in the state, increasing 
compliance with and reducing resistance to it. Against this background, this section 
evaluates the evidence on the relationship between responding to public 
expectations and state legitimacy. It identifies the core principles of this link and asks 
whether the provision of public services forms a key component of state legitimacy. It 
is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the specific ways in which this 
relationship works and can be enhanced, and to provide specific evidence for 
particular approaches or tools for improving state legitimacy in this way (but see 
Mcloughlin and Scott 2014 for some reflections on this question). 
The literature search identified 29 articles.912 The majority of contributions 
were literature reviews and conceptual papers (partially combined with case studies),  
comparative and multi-case studies. The search identified a small number of 
quantitative studies. This structure of the evidence reflects the nature of the research 
problem: the implementation, the providers and recipients of public services vary 
strongly across different sectors and countries, making cross-sector and cross-
country comparisons difficult. 
 
4.1 Responding to Public Expectations Matters for Legitimacy… 
In general, the evidence continues to support the claim that service delivery forms a 
key component of state legitimacy, especially in conflict-affected states (e.g. Baird 
2010, Batley and Mcloughlin 2012). States have a strong incentive to deliver a 
service which has historically been a key source of legitimacy for the state, and elites’ 
calculations of political returns can lead to improved service provision. Therefore, 
available resources alone do not determine the outcome of service delivery, but also 
the political processes surrounding the implementation of services.  
The literature also supports BPSS’s focus on ensuring equitable access to 
public services to avoid exacerbating existing inequalities (Rolleston, James and 
Aurino 2014). Walton (2012), for example, demonstrates how women and minority 
groups are further marginalised in regions that are under-serviced. Inclusive and 
                                                          
9 The following keywords were used for SCOPUS and Web of Science: service delivery AND 
peacebuilding; job creation AND peacebuilding; job creation AND state legitimacy; service delivery 
AND state legitimacy; service delivery AND state responsiveness; inclusive growth AND state 
legitimacy. As Google Scholars offers a full-text search, the search was carried out with a 
combination of three keywords to narrow the results. The keywords used are: service delivery, 
state legitimacy AND statebuilding; job creation, state legitimacy AND statebuilding; and state 
legitimacy AND state responsiveness AND conflict-affected. Following the initial search, 
additional literature was identified from the citations within Google Scholar as well as using the snowball 
system. Only evidence published from 2010 onwards was considered. 
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equitable service provision is therefore considered as a crucial mechanism to 
enhance social cohesion, diffuse conflict and build the grounds for sustainable 
peace, especially when local governance actors are involved in the process 
(Jaervinnen 2013). Within all sectors, equitable access is seen as a key factor to 
address and possibly overcome existing inequalities. In addition, more inclusive 
service delivery may also enhance the positive perception of the state in the public 
eye (Practical Action, Save the Children & CfBT Education Trust 2011). 
Recent evidence, however, also qualifies the assumption of a causal link 
between satisfying public expectations and state legitimacy. Sacks (2011), for 
example, finds that subjective perceptions of satisfaction with services are only 
weakly correlated with objective measures of delivery. Possible explanations are that 
citizens reward or punish relative improvement/deterioration of service provision, but 
not the overall level; or that they only recognise an improvement in service delivery 
when it directly impacts on their personal livelihood; or that citizens simply do not 
attribute service provision to the government (Mcloughlin 2014). In Uganda, for 
example, improved local satisfaction with health clinics did not translate into overall 
improved perceptions of the state (Bukenya 2013). Citizen’s expectations towards 
the state may generally be low, thus making the alignment of service delivery with 
citizen’s expectations difficult (Stel 2011, Stel and Abate 2014, see also Mcloughlin 
2014); and expectations may change over time (Practical Action, Save the Children 
& CfBT Education Trust 2011), not least as a consequence of the actual experience 
of service provision The involvement of international actors can further decrease the 
visibility (and perceived legitimacy) of state actors in providing public services 
(Cometto, Fritsche, and Sondorp 2010).10 
 
… but little evidence on how. 
However, whilst there seems to be a consensus that service delivery matters, there 
is less agreement on how it matters and what the determinants of successful service 
delivery are, especially across various sectors. As there is both diversity with regard 
to the observed impact of service delivery on state legitimacy, and the possible 
causal pathways across different sectors (e.g. health, education, water), it is not 
possible to generalise on the basis of the existing evidence (Practical Action, Save 
the Children & CfBT Education Trust 2011). Furthermore, whilst there is some 
                                                          
10 Preliminary research findings from the DFID-funded Secure Livelihoods Research consortium (SLRC) 
similarly suggest that the link between public service delivery and perceptions of state legitimacy is 
complex, based on the first round of a longitudinal multi-country household survey. 
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evidence demonstrating that inadequate service delivery contributes to low 
legitimacy and possibly violent conflict (Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg and Dunn 2012), 
empirical evidence for the reverse is limited. The majority of studies cannot explain 
how service delivery might enhance legitimacy (Mcloughlin 2014). The 
inconclusiveness of the evidence in this regard is also fuelled by the wide variation in 
the quality and availability of data. 
Finally, there is also little evidence that focussing on strengthening overall 
state capacity results in improved provision of public services. In a cross-national 
analysis of over 150 states, Lee et al. (2014) find little evidence for a strong 
relationship between state capacity and service delivery. This challenges the notion 
that building state capacity directly contributes to the reduction of grievances, if the 
willingness of states to address these grievances is not also increased. Overall, the 
evidence review suggests that there is no single pathway from service delivery to 
state legitimacy, and that the involvement of local and non-state actors can affect 
trust and legitimacy negatively and positively. 
 
4.2 Promoting Inclusive Growth 
Inclusive economic growth, which generates employment across society and which 
transforms the structure of the economy enabling productivity to rise, is considered 
central to promoting stability. In addition to the investment and right regulatory 
environment that promotes growth, inclusive growth depends on the right type of 
political settlement with the appropriate distributive effects, on mechanisms 
supporting reasonably equitable and open access to natural resources (including 
land), and on low levels of corruption. 
It is widely accepted that there is a clear correlation between economic growth 
and stability, and it is prominently reflected in Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s work 
on the economic correlates of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). There are different 
causal mechanisms that might underpin this relationship: 
 
 Economic growth provides states with resources (through taxation or other 
forms of extraction) to strengthen their capacity for coercion and for providing 
public goods
 Economic growth can reduce societal grievances if its benefits are widely 
distributed
 Economic growth provides employment opportunities and thereby increases 
the opportunity cost of selecting to fight over other economic activities. 
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Given the focus of BPSS on inclusive growth, the focus of the evidence review here 
is not on what generates economic growth, but on factors promoting inclusivity. As 
the evidence around inclusive political settlements and around natural resource 
management are examined in earlier sections of the paper, the focus here is on job 
creation and on corruption. 
 
4.3 Job creation 
Employment growth is a key characteristic of inclusive growth. Its alleged contribution to 
stability rests mainly on reducing the opportunity cost of engaging in armed conflict. An 
evidence search identified 25 studies, including one systematic review.1114 
The quality of most of the studies is low: many of the papers are largely 
descriptive, and the case studies are chosen opportunistically, with their wider 
relevance largely unclear. Other problems include a lack of evidence supporting the 
conclusions, little data (and little clarity about its provenance and reliability), or a 
focus on “lessons learned” without much focus on the relevant causal mechanisms. 
Many of the weaker studies assert rather than evidence the (largely positive) 
outcomes of employment interventions they describe. The stronger qualitative papers 
and the experimental studies on the other hand often find no discernible robust 
causal relationship, or are more nuanced in their assessment of the impact of such 
interventions. 
The quality of the evidence is inherently limited by the quality of data – a 
problem in particular of large-n studies that rely on national unemployment data that, 
as the 2011 World Development Report highlights, is problematic in many conflict 
environments (World Bank 2011). Many macro-level studies of the relationship 
between unemployment and conflict therefore work with problematic proxies for 
employment and the opportunity cost of participating in violent conflict, e.g. the level 
of education (as criticised by Cramer 2006, and Keen 2012). The intervention-level 
studies captured by this evidence review often also suffer from data problems, but of 
a different kind: many of them provide little data in support of their claims. In terms of 
research design, they often focus on measuring outputs (e.g. training delivered) 
                                                          
11 The search employed the following terms: Employment AND peacebuilding OR peace-building OR 
peacekeeping; and “Cash for Work” AND peacebuilding OR peace-building OR peacekeeping. This 
searches in Scopus and Web of Science identified 15 *(Scopus) and 9 (WoS) for the first term, and 2 
(Scopus) and 1(WoS) for the second. In addition, searches with the same key words in Google Scholar 
resulted in 41,500 and 463 hit respectively. 22 papers were selected on title, and this was reduced to 12 
following a review of abstracts. An additional five papers were review articles, and a further 8 were 
identified from other articles, yielding a total of 25 studies. 
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rather than outcomes (e.g. reductions in violence; or greater social cohesion). Some 
studies, while methodologically robust, have no cross-country coverage, and it is not 
possible to easily generalise from their findings (e.g. Blattman et al. 2014, Iyengar et 
al. 2011). 
From a macro-level perspective, the studies engage with the general view in 
the wider literature that unemployment, especially youth unemployment, increases 
the risk of civil war (for a critical review, see Cramer 2010 and Justino 2010). The 
evidence challenges a common view on the literature (and one of the assumptions 
underpinning much economic peacebuilding work) that unemployment, especially 
youth unemployment, increases the risk of armed conflict. Not only is the empirical 
support for a direct causal relationship between unemployment and violent conflict 
very limited; to the extent that such a causal relationship exists, it is clearly complex 
and cannot be reduced to the notion of reducing the opportunity cost of conflict. It 
suggests that a mere uplift in the number of jobs – be it through economic growth in 
the long term, or through dedicated employment programmes in the short term – has 
an uncertain impact on the prevalence of violent conflict. 
At the micro-level, the focus of many of the studies identified in the evidence 
review is on the opportunity cost of violence (e.g. examining whether employment 
programmes reduced the likelihood of former combatants to be recruited as 
mercenaries);12and on the impact of employment programmes on grievances and 
social cohesion (Blattman et al. 2014). Generally, these studies have not found a 
clear relationship between employment generation schemes – e.g. cash or training 
programmes on risks of violence or conflict, supporting the argument made by 
Cramer and others that any existing causal relationship between unemployment and 
conflict is complex. One exception is an independent impact evaluation of 
employment development programmes by different US military units in Iraq, 
suggesting a positive correlation between spending on such programmes and 
reductions in armed violence (Iyengar et al. 2011). Importantly, some of the 
qualitative work has also highlighted the risk that employment or cash for work 
programmes can fuel grievances and perceptions of bias and preferential treatment, 
and in that way possibly fuel violence (e.g. Fishstein 2011). 
 
4.4 Corruption 
A recent DFID evidence paper on the causes and effects of corruption demonstrates 
                                                          
12 Blattman and Anan 2011; Fishstein 2011; Gompelman 2011; Gordon 2011. 
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that the latter has an independent effect on the delivery and quality of public 
services, and on government legitimacy. It finds strong evidence that corruption is 
negatively correlated with levels of confidence in public institutions, but also that the 
causal direction between corruption and low confidence is unclear, and the 
relationship is dynamic. (Anderson and Tverdova 2003). Increased levels of 
corruption undermine social trust (Seligson 2002), which in turn might increase the 
likelihood to engage in corrupt practices (Morris and Klesner 2010). 
Despite prominent claims that corruption fuels and exacerbates conflict 
dynamics in fragile states (Rotberg 2009, Chayes 2015), the evidence paper 
highlights that the evidence is mixed, with some of it pointing to increases in the risk 
of violence (Le Billon 2003, World Bank 2011), whilst others find that corruption can 
function as enabling or contributing factor when forming political settlements (Zaum 
2013). It should be noted that most of the research reviewed in the evidence paper 
precedes the period covered in this assessment. 
 
4.5 Assessment 
Generally, the evidence supports claims that responding to public expectations can 
contribute to peace- and statebuilding, and to strengthening stability. While the 
evidence suggests that responding to pubic expectations (largely framed in terms of 
service delivery) can help to bolster legitimacy, it also nuances the claim and the 
underlying theory of change by highlighting the complex relationship both between 
service delivery and legitimacy, and between legitimacy and stability. The evidence 
for the impact of inclusive growth is weaker, with contested findings as to the causal 
impact of job creation on violent conflict, and conflicting impacts of corruption on 
stability. 
 
 
 
5 Addressing causes and effects of conflict 
Addressing the causes and effects of conflict is described as “core business” for 
DFID in BPSS (p.20), and as an objective is super-imposed as a lens on the others, 
rather than developed as its own separate sphere of activities. BPSS highlights the 
complex (and multiple) causes of conflict (see also World Bank 2011), focussing in 
particular on grievances (e.g. ethnicity based exclusion), opportunities (e.g. 
availability of natural resources to fund armed activity), and feasibility (e.g. difficult 
terrain facilitating rebel activity, or weak security forces that might oppose them). To 
21 
 
the extent that this conflict lens informs the other objectives in BPSS, their focus is 
largely on reducing grievances and, through the emphasis on increasing state 
legitimacy, on reducing feasibility. They focus on the character of the political 
settlement, the capacity of the state to provide public goods and services, and the 
relationship of state institutions to different social groups. 
Very few of the model’s statebuilding efforts aim at reducing opportunities – 
an interesting contrast to the literature on civil war which has been strongly focussed 
on opportunity and the opportunity cost of engaging in armed conflict, rather than 
grievances.13The focus on grievance-related causes, however, is supported by a 
growing literature in recent years offering systematic, and robust, evidence for the 
importance of grievances as a cause of violent conflict (Cederman et al. 2013; 
Stewart 2010). According to this growing body of work, violent conflict is a response 
to the exclusion of groups from access to important public goods and services, the 
selective denial of key rights (often linked to identity – e.g. language rights or rights of 
religious expression), or from economic opportunities. It could also be the 
consequence of a general inability (rather than selective and targeted unwillingness) 
of a government to fulfil the expectations of large parts of its population, fuelling 
discontent and grievances with the government that escalate into violent conflict. 
While there is strong evidence for the role of grievances in causing violent 
conflict, this does not necessarily mean that addressing these original grievances is 
an effective path to peace. As Woodward (2007) has highlighted, armed conflict is 
transformative: the grievances that caused violent conflict in the first place might not 
be what sustained it over the years, and incentivised elites to eschew a settlement. 
Other scholars, such as Keen and Cramer, have similarly highlighted the functional 
logic of violence in many developing (and developed) countries, in particular the 
degree to which it enables particular groups to exercise political power and to 
privately benefit economically (Cramer 2006; Keen 2012). 
 
5.1 Alternative explanations for violence and armed conflict 
In addition to grievances, opportunities, and feasibility, additional sources of violent 
conflict have been emphasised in public and policy discourses in recent years, in 
particular the role of religious extremism and the role of transnational organised 
crime. 
There is a growing body of evidence on the causal relationship between 
religion and conflict, and it generally finds that religion (or religiosity) on its own does 
                                                          
13 For a good summary of the literature, see Blattman and Miguel 2011. 
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not explain the onset of armed conflict, but also suggests that religion in conjunction 
with other factors plays an important role. As a study by the Institute for Economics 
and Peace of 35 armed conflicts in 2013 suggests, religion was one of multiple 
causes in 21 of these conflicts, but always I conjunction with other causes (Institute 
for Economics and Peace 2014). 
A range of studies (Finke and Harris 2012; Finke and Martin 2012, Dowd 
2014) trace violence that is attributed to religion back to other grievances. In these 
cases, religious affiliation acts as an identity along which rebels mobilise excluded 
communities against a government. As Basedau et al. (2014) confirm, the overlap of 
religious and other (especially ethnic) identities in cases of discrimination and 
exclusion increases the likelihood of armed conflict. Both Dowd (2014) and Canetti et 
al. (2010) emphasise the instrumentalisation of religion by potential rebel leaders to 
mobilise against a state. Overall, religion and religious extremism are best 
considered as particular dimensions of the grievances and opportunities dimensions 
of the literature on violent conflict, rather than a distinct logic of conflict or state 
fragility. 
While organised crime is highly correlated with state fragility and violent 
conflict, there is currently no strong evidence that it causes violent conflict, but a 
stronger link between organised crime and state fragility. The evidence highlights the 
role of organised crime in financing conflict (e.g. Taylor 2013), and the way in which 
organised crime can undermine state capacity and legitimacy (e.g. Cockayne 2011, 
Kavanagh et al. 2013). Overall, this literature is very small and underdeveloped, and 
provides no sufficient basis for substantially changing the current peace- and 
statebuilding model. 
 
5.2 Directly addressing conflict dynamics 
Considering objective 1 as merely a lens imposed on the other PBSB objectives, 
however, risks underplaying the importance of a focus on mechanisms of conflict 
resolution. A separate scoping exercise examining responses to conflict identified a 
wide range of conflict resolution and prevention interventions, and responses to 
armed conflict, that go beyond the statebuilding interventions covered by BPSS.14 
These include the promotion of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, DDR 
measures, peace education, working with victims of displacement, community level 
(and national level) dialogue and mediation, sanctions, and peacekeeping. While 
                                                          
14 This exercise was conducted in 2013/4 in preparation for a conflict –focussed research programme. It 
encompassed a literature review, a focus group, and a survey of DFID conflict and governance advisors. 
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some of these efforts are at times closely integrated with wider state- and 
peacebuilding efforts (e.g. peacekeeping operations), others can run in parallel (e.g. 
sanctions regimes) or precede peace- and statebuilding mandates (e.g. mediation 
and peace negotiations). While it is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the 
evidence for all of these, a brief assessment of the evidence for three of them – third 
party mediation, sanctions, and peacekeeping operations – highlights the limitations 
that the current understanding of objective 1 imposes on the peace- and statebuilding 
approach outlined in BPSS. 
 
5.3 Third Party Mediation 
Mediation is commonly understood as ‘a process of conflict management, related to 
but distinct from the parties’ own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the 
assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider to change their perceptions 
or behaviour, and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority 
of law’ (Bercovitch 2009:343). In the literature, mediation is used to refer both to inter- 
and intrastate conflicts, although conflicts can be both, local and international in 
nature (Kalyvas 2006). Some distinguish between mediated and negotiated 
settlements (Bercovitch and Jackson 2001). 
Reagon and Aydin (2006) find that mediation is the most common form of 
diplomatic intervention (compared to, for example, the limitation or termination of 
diplomatic relations or the use of international forums such as the UN) and can 
reduce the duration of civil conflicts. According to Greig and Diehl (2010), there has 
been an increase in the mediations efforts since the 1990s, whilst Kreutz (2010) 
shows that there has also been an increase in peace settlements since 1989 which 
may suggest that the increase in mediation efforts has led to a higher number of 
peace agreements (Hoeffler 2014). 
As Wallenstein and Svensson (2014) point out, one of the challenges to 
mediation research is that the literature uses a variety of definitions for their success, 
with some defining the mere occurrence of mediation as a success and others the 
termination of violent behaviour. Another distinction is made between short-term and 
long-term outcomes of mediation efforts. 
DeRouen and Moller (2013), for example, carry out a quantitative analysis of 
low-intensity civil wars from 1993 and 2004 and find that direct forms of mediation 
(face-to-face) are most likely to achieve short-term success for de-escalation. In 
another study, DeRouen et al. (2011) find that mediation efforts can be successful 
(defined as reaching an agreement, ceasefire, partial settlement, full settlement and 
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process arrangements) in managing intrastate conflicts. However, there is also some 
evidence that mediation efforts are not the most successful path for lasting peace. 
Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) find that international disputes that receive mediation 
are less likely to result in peace agreements, and mediated agreements are more 
likely to fail. It therefore remains unclear whether mediation efforts can contribute to 
long-term peace. However, as Hoeffler (2014) points out, mediators are often 
deployed in conflicts that are difficult to solve which may skew the results in one 
direction. Empirical studies (De Rouen et al. 2011) confirm that these are often 
conflicts with a high number of fatalities which have gone on for a long time. The 
literature suggests that there are trade-offs between short-term and long-term peace 
and that whilst mediation helps to agree on a settlement, in the majority of cases 
these tend to be fragile (Beardsley 2011). 
 
4.4 Sanctions 
The evidence regarding the effectiveness of sanctions is mixed. On the one hand, 
Hufbauer et al. (2007) find that a third of cases they investigate are successful with 
regard to the policy change they seek (e.g. the release of a prisoner), and Petrescu 
(2012) shows that sanctions can deter countries from engaging in a future conflict. 
On the other hand, a range of scholars highlight the negative impact of sanctions: on 
the human rights situation in targeted states (Wood 2008), on corruption and the 
criminalization of the state (Andreas 2005), on democracy (Peksen and Drury 2010), 
and on stability (Marinow 2005). 
This in turn has led many to emphasise the need for smart (or targeted) 
sanctions, such as travel bans (Wallensteen, Staibano and Eriksson 2003, Allan and 
Lektzian 2013). There is, however, no robust evidence as to whether smart sanctions 
are indeed more effective than ‘traditional’ sanctions (Gordon 2011, Drezner 2011). 
The evidence thus suggests that overall, sanctions are likely to induce only modest 
policy change (Hoeffler 2014). 
The evidence on the particular impact of economic sanctions on the risk and 
duration of civil war is contradictory. Regan and Aydin (2006) find no evidence that 
economic sanctions decrease the duration of civil war, and Regan and Meachum 
(2014) show that economic sanctions are uncorrelated with outbreaks of conflict. 
Escriba-Folch (2010), however, finds that the duration of economic sanctions is 
associated with shorter intrastate conflicts. The study also shows that economic 
embargos are the most effective measure to increase the likelihood of a military and 
negotiated termination of conflict, whilst international arms embargos reduce the 
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likelihood of military victory. Strandow (2006), in contrast, finds that implemented 
arms embargos have the highest likelihood of positively influencing the parties of 
move towards conflict resolution. Both findings should be treated with caution, as 
they only account for a small number of cases and may overlook the possibility that 
economic sanctions are often applied in cases where they are likely to succeed 
(Carayannis et al. 2014). The fact that this evidence review does not bring up 
extensive empirical research may also be a consequence of sanctions not being a 
conflict resolution tool themselves, but rather an instrument in a wider conflict 
resolution process, and contributing to this process in an indirect way (Griffiths and 
Barnes 2008). In addition, UN sanction regimes are analysed with a view to their 
specific objectives and measures (for example Charron 2011), but without a 
subsequent analysis of the effects on the conflict. 
 
4.5 UN Peacekeeping 
There is general agreement in the literature that peacekeeping helps to reduce the 
risk of conflict recurrence. Doyle and Sambanis (2006), using a variety of statistical 
methods, find strong evidence that the duration of peace is longer and wars are less 
likely to recur with the deployment of peacekeeping missions. Collier et al. (2008), 
Fortna (2008) and Mason et al. (2011) confirm these findings. Beardsley (2011) 
moreover shows that the deployment of peacekeepers can contribute to help to 
contain the spread of conflict. Furthermore, the success of UN peacekeeping is not 
endogenous: Peacekeepers are not just sent to situations that are ‘easy to solve’ 
(Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Mason et al. 2011). This effect is also confirmed for 
other UN interventions, such as mediation and sanctions, with Beardsley and 
Schmidt (2012) observing a close correlation between crisis severity and UN 
involvement, albeit their data only accounts for international crises. 
Following Hultman (2013), the likelihood of peacekeeping operations is higher 
in situation where the warring parties target the civilian population. However, even 
when missions include a clear protection mandate, it has been noted that capacities 
to do so are still underdeveloped (Bellamy 2009). Moreover, it remains unclear which 
measures are best suited to deal with violence against civilians, as research has 
shown that only robust mandates or specific mandates to protect civilians are 
effective in reducing violence (Kreps and Wallace 2009). This is confirmed by 
Kathman and Wood (2014) who show that a larger number of peacekeeping troops 
reduces violence against civilians and, in contrast, larger numbers of UN observers 
are positively correlated with violence. 
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Doyle and Sambanis (2006) also suggest that multidimensional peacekeeping 
operations – which are now the norm – are more effective than traditional forms of 
peacekeeping in increasing durable peace. Similarly, Hultman et al. (2015) find that 
as the number of UN military troops (as opposed to unarmed personnel) employed 
increases, the chance of recurrence of civil war decreases. However, some authors 
find potential trade-offs of military engagement. Beardsley (2012), for example, 
shows that UN peacekeeping decreases the chances of one warring party to achieve 
victory, but also decreases the chance of compromise. 
 
 
6 Changes in the Evidence Landscape – Implications for Building 
Peaceful States and Societies 
Overall, this assessment suggests that the research evidence as it has developed 
since 2010 broadly supports the objectives of the peace- and statebuilding 
framework as outlined in BPSS: 
 
 Evidence on promoting elite settlements is robust, as is evidence that in the 
long run open settlements are developmental. However, evidence also points 
to tensions between the two, and provides little with regard to the 
transformation processes.  
 Evidence supports the model’s focus on strengthening core state functions, 
with the exception of natural resource management. However, it also 
highlights tensions between strengthening state capacity and peacebuilding. 
While these are acknowledged in BPSS, the evidence suggests that their 
implications need to be developed further. 
 Evidence broadly supports the emphasis on responding to public 
expectations, but provides little evidence on how improvements in service 
delivery contribute to state legitimacy. While the model rests strongly on the 
role of legitimacy, the evidence suggests that the relationship between 
service delivery and legitimacy is complex, and poorly understood. 
 Evidence supports the identified main causes of conflict and fragility, and 
does not support independent alternative causes. The evidence raises the 
question whether the current role of objective 1 in the model as a lens rather 
than an independent set of activities underplays the contribution of dedicated 
conflict resolution activities, and risks underplaying the potential tensions 
between state- and peacebuilding. 
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 This review thus supports the overall direction of the peace- and statebuilding 
model, it also highlights that there are substantial gaps in the evidence, as 
well as gaps and tensions in the model. 
 
The evidence gaps are largely about the how: we know that inclusive political 
settlements matter, but know little about how to promote and support them; we are 
confident that responding to public expectations contributes to peace- and 
statebuilding, but often struggle to identify interventions that make governments more 
responsive. In addition, the evidence nuances some of the often bold assumptions of 
the model. In particular, it suggests that we need a more nuanced understanding of 
legitimacy, how it is generated in state- and peacebuilding contexts, and how it 
translates (if at all) into greater stability. 
In addition to gaps in the evidence, the review highlights gaps in the model: 
as it currently stands, the model does not systematically account for the role of 
informal actors exercising public authority; and for the regional and international 
environment on fragility. With regard to the former, the literature increasingly 
highlights the role of informal actors in exercising public authority and providing 
public goods and services – be they markets, a modicum of justice, education, or 
basic infrastructure. The way the peace- and statebuilding model frames two of its 
key dimensions, core state functions and responding to public expectations, 
however, has arguably encouraged a focus on formal state institutions. With regard 
to the latter, international factors are largely absent from the model, despite a greater 
focus in recent years in the analysis of fragility on the role of issues such as 
migration, illicit financial flows, dynamics and structures of international trade, and 
the role of transnational ideologies. 
The evidence review also highlights two important tensions in the model. The 
first is between state- and peacebuilding. While BPSS assumes that the relationship 
between them is not only unproblematic but mutually reinforcing, the evidence review 
suggests that not only peace- and statebuilding objectives can conflict, but also 
different statebuilding objectives (e.g. inclusive settlements and more responsive 
state institutions). This tension was also identified in an accompanying operational 
stock-take of the use of BPSS by country offices. 
The second tension in BPSS is between an explicitly political approach to 
state- and peacebuilding, reflected in particular in the emphasis on political 
settlements, and a more “technocratic” approach reflected in the focus on 
strengthening state capacity and the common framing of “responding to public 
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expectations” predominantly in terms of service delivery. Again, this is a tension 
identified in the operational stock take. A technocratic approach is also reflected in 
the focus of the model on state institutions at the expense of the sub-state and local 
level, and the relationships of institutions at these levels with state institutions. Given 
that in terms of analysis (e.g. through the CPRD) and programming, DFID is deeply 
engaged at the sub-state level (including with peace- and statebuilding 
programming), actual practice has outpaced the existing formal policy framework. 
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